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This document serves as a supplement to the main article, providing additional details on the sampling approach, sample size determination, model training procedures, and evaluation metrics used in the study of Open Science Practices (OSP) adoption in scientific publications. The full methodological report, containing all code necessary for full replication can be accessed in the OSF repository.
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# Data Availability
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## Legal Considerations
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The TDM policies of all publishers whose content appears in the corpus were reviewed individually. The majority of publishers explicitly permit TDM under institutional access or open-access conditions, including SAGE, Cambridge University Press, Taylor & Francis, Nature, Emerald, Annual Reviews (upon request), and Wiley (via API). Elsevier permits TDM via its official API but not scraping. Oxford University Press permissions depend on the institutional library agreement, and Brill permits TDM depending on the individual article licence. ASCE explicitly prohibits TDM. For publishers where no explicit policy was found (Modern Law Review) or where policies were ambiguous, EU Directive 2019/790 (Articles 3 and 4) was applied as the operative framework, which broadly permits TDM for scientific research purposes by authorised users accessing content through institutional subscriptions. MDPI and Internet Policy Review content is fully open access and permissively licensed. Regardless of whether TDM is permitted, the right to mine does not extend to a right to redistribute the underlying full texts, which is the operative restriction on public data sharing in this study. Therefore, only metadata can be made available. The labelled dataset containing metadata and OSP labels for the sample is available in the OSF repository.
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## Replication Materials
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All code necessary for full replication of the study is available in the OSF repository at the following link:
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- https://osf.io/rvpc3/overview?view_only=0307dc0d99f74b50a738720a4a757aa0
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The Files contain three subfolders:
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- A code folder containing the full, **raw** quarto project with all code and data necessary for replication. A README file with instructions for replication is included in the code folder. This also includes a preprocessed dataset containing metadata and OSP labels for the sample, which can be used for replication of the analysis and figures in the main article without needing to run the full code. This version is more suitable for users with less experience in R, as it allows for a more straightforward replication of the results. A README file with instructions for replication is included in the data folder.
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- A manuscript folder containing the full manuscript quarto project that was used for all analyses and figures in the main article.
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- The fully **rendered** Methodological Report, which contains all details on the methods used in the study, including the sampling approach, sample size determination, model training procedures, and evaluation metrics. The report also contains discussions of all decisions taken during the process, as well as the full descriptions and specifications of the models used and the preprocessing steps.
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# Sampling Approach
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The process involved in the following steps:
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Paywall Status: open_access
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================================================================================
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TITLE: The passage of Australia’s data retention regime: national security, human rights, and media scrutiny
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TITLE: The passage of Australia's data retention regime: national security, human rights, and media scrutiny
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AUTHORS: Nicolas P. Suzor, Kylie Pappalardo, Natalie McIntosh
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ABSTRACT:
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Abstract
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In 2015, the Australian government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which requires ISPs to collect metadata about their users and store this metadata for two years. From its conception, Australia’s data retention scheme has been controversial. In this article we examine how public interest concerns were addressed in Australian news media during the Act’s passage. The Act was ultimately passed with bipartisan support, despite serious deficiencies. We show how the Act’s complexity seemed to limit engaged critique in the mainstream media and how fears over terrorist attacks were exploited to secure the Act’s passage through parliament.
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In 2015, the Australian government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which requires ISPs to collect metadata about their users and store this metadata for two years. From its conception, Australia's data retention scheme has been controversial. In this article we examine how public interest concerns were addressed in Australian news media during the Act's passage. The Act was ultimately passed with bipartisan support, despite serious deficiencies. We show how the Act's complexity seemed to limit engaged critique in the mainstream media and how fears over terrorist attacks were exploited to secure the Act's passage through parliament.
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FULL TEXT:
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Title: The passage of Australia’s data retention regime: national security, human rights, and media scrutiny
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Title: The passage of Australia's data retention regime: national security, human rights, and media scrutiny
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Abstract: Abstract
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In 2015, the Australian government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which requires ISPs to collect metadata about their users and store this metadata for two years. From its conception, Australia’s data retention scheme has been controversial. In this article we examine how public interest concerns were addressed in Australian news media during the Act’s passage. The Act was ultimately passed with bipartisan support, despite serious deficiencies. We show how the Act’s complexity seemed to limit engaged critique in the mainstream media and how fears over terrorist attacks were exploited to secure the Act’s passage through parliament.
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In 2015, the Australian government passed the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act, which requires ISPs to collect metadata about their users and store this metadata for two years. From its conception, Australia's data retention scheme has been controversial. In this article we examine how public interest concerns were addressed in Australian news media during the Act's passage. The Act was ultimately passed with bipartisan support, despite serious deficiencies. We show how the Act's complexity seemed to limit engaged critique in the mainstream media and how fears over terrorist attacks were exploited to secure the Act's passage through parliament.
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This paper is part of Australian internet policy, a special issue of Internet Policy Review guest-edited by Angela Daly and Julian Thomas.
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